Abstract. The previous key recovery attacks against Helix obtain the key with about 2 88 operations using chosen nonces (reusing nonce) and about 1000 adaptively chosen plaintext words (or 2 35.6 chosen plaintext words). The stream cipher Phelix is the strengthened version of Helix. In this paper we apply the differential-linear cryptanalysis to recover the key of Phelix. With 2 34 chosen nonces and 2 37 chosen plaintext words, the key of Phelix can be recovered with about 2 41.5 operations.
Introduction
Phelix [5] is a fast stream cipher with an embedded authentication mechanism. It is one of the focus ciphers (both software and hardware) of the ECRYPT eS-TREAM project. Phelix is a strengthened version of the stream cipher Helix [1] .
Muller has applied differential attack to Helix [2] . He showed that the key of Helix can be recovered faster than by brute force if the attacker can force the initialization vectors to be used more than once. The attack requires about 2 12 adaptively chosen plaintext words and 2 88 operations. Paul and Preneel reduced the number of adaptively chosen plaintext words by a factor of at least 3 [4] . Later Paul and Preneel showed that 2 35.6 chosen plaintext words can be used instead of adaptively chosen plaintexts [3] . All these key recovery attacks against Helix require about 2 88 operations. Phelix was designed and submitted to the ECRYPT eSTREAM project in 2005. The output function of Helix has been changed so that a larger plaintext diffusion can be achieved in Phelix. The Phelix designers claimed that Phelix is able to resist a differential key recovery attack even if the nonce is reused: "We claim, however, that even in such a case (referring to nonce reuse) it remains infeasible to recover the key" [5] .
In this paper, we apply differential-linear cryptanalysis to Phelix assuming nonce reuse (this corresponds to a chosen nonce attack). We show that the key of Phelix can be recovered with a low complexity: 2 37 chosen plaintext words and 2 41.5 operations. Although the Phelix designers did expect that Phelix would loose most of its security properties when the nonce is reused, this paper shows that Phelix is completely insecure in such a setting. This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we illustrate the operations of Phelix. Section 3 analyzes how the addend bits affect the differential distribution. Section 4 describes a basic differential key recovery attack on Phelix. The improved attack is given in Sect. 5. We discuss how to strengthen Phelix in Sect. 6 . Section 7 concludes this paper.
The Stream Cipher Phelix
In this section, we only consider the encryption algorithm of Phelix. The full description of Phelix is given in [5] . The key size and nonce size of Phelix are 256 bits and 128 bits, respectively. The designers claim that there is no attack against Phelix with less than 2 128 operations. Phelix updates fives 32-bit words: Z 0 , Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 and Z 4 . At the ith step, two secret 32-bit words X i,0 , X i,1 and one 32-bit plaintext word P i are applied to update the internal states. One 32-bit keystream word S i is generated and is used to encrypt the plaintext P i . Note that the plaintext is used to update the internal state so that the authentication can be performed. The word X i,0 is related to the key, and the word X i,1 is related to the key and nonce in a very simple way. Recovering any X i,0 and X i,1 implies recovering part of the key. One step of Phelix is given in Fig. 1 .
The Differential Propagation of Addition
In this section, we study how the addend bits affect the differential propagation. The importance of this study is that it shows that the values of the addend bits can be determined by observing the differential distribution of the sum. Theorem 1. Denote φ i as the ith least significant bit of φ. Suppose two positive m-bit integers φ and φ differ only at the nth least significant bit position (φ ⊕ φ = 2 n ). Let β be an m-bit random integer (m is much larger than n). Let ψ = φ + β and ψ = φ + β. For β n = 0, denote the probability that ψ n+i = ψ n+i as p n+i,0 . For β n = 1, denote the probability that ψ n+i = ψ n+i as p n+i,1 . Then
Theorem 1 can be proved easily if we consider the bias in the carry bits. We omit the proof here. In Theorem 1, the bias of the differential distribution decreases quickly as the value of n increases. We need another differential property that produces difference with a large bias even for large n. Before introducing that property, we give the following lemma from [6] .
Lemma 1. Denote u and v as two random and independent n-bit integers. Let c n = (u + v) > > n, where c n denotes the carry bit at the nth least significant bit position. Denote the most significant bit of u as u n−1 . Then Pr(c n ⊕ u n−1 = 0) = The large bias of the differential distribution for large n is given below.
Theorem 2.
Denote φ i as the ith least significant bit of φ. Suppose two positive m-bit integers φ and φ differ only at the nth least significant bit position (φ ⊕ φ = 2 n ). Let β be an m-bit random integer (m is much larger than n).
Let ψ = φ + β and ψ = φ + β. For β n ⊕ β n−1 = 0, denote the probability that ψ n+i = ψ n+i asp n+i,0 . For β n ⊕ β n−1 = 1, denote the probability that
Proof. Denote the carry bit at the ith least significant bit position in ψ = φ + β as c i , and that in ψ = φ + β as c i . Note that c n = c n , thus c n ⊕ β n = c n ⊕ β n . When c n ⊕ β n = c n ⊕ β n = 0, we know that ψ ⊕ ψ = 2 n with probability 1, i.e., ψ n+i = ψ n+i with probability 1 for i > 0. When c n ⊕β n = c n ⊕β n = 1, by induction we obtain that ψ n+i = ψ n+i with probability 1 − 2 −i+1 for i > 0. According to Lemma 1, we know that c n ⊕ β n−1 = 0 with probability 
The above two theorems provide the guidelines to recover the key of Phelix. However, these two theorems deal with the ideal cases in which there is only one bit difference between φ and φ , and β is assumed to be random. In the attacks, we deal with the complicated situation where each bit of φ ⊕ φ is biased, and β is a fixed integer. The value of each bit of β will affect the distribution of the higher order bits of (φ + β) ⊕ (φ + β) in a complicated way. In order to simplify the analysis, we will use simulations to obtain these relations in the attacks.
A Basic Key Recovery Attack on Phelix
We will first investigate the differential propagation in Phelix. Then we show how to recover the key of Phelix by observing the differential distribution of the keystream.
The bias in the differential distribution of the keystream
Assume an attacker can choose an arbitrary value for the nonce, then a nonce can be used more than once. We introduce one-bit difference into the plaintext at the ith step, i.e., P i = P i , and (as indicated in Fig. 1 ). If all the carry bits are 0 (replacing all the additions with XORs), then the differences only appear at the 9th, 11th, 13th, 15th and 17th least significant bits between B (i+1) 3 and B (i+1) 3 . Because of the carry bits, the differential distribution becomes complicated. We run the simulation and use the randomly generated Y with probability close to 0. Note that T
will be affected by the value of X The above analysis gives a brief idea of the attack. However, the actual attacks are quite complicated due to the interference of many differences. It is very tedious to derive exactly how the distribution of
On the other hand, it is easy to search for the relation with simulations. In the following, we carried out a simulation to find the relation between the value of X j+1 i+1,0 ⊕ X j i+1,0 and the distribution of
Let two plaintexts differ only in the ith word, and P i ⊕ P i = 1. We use the randomly generated Y 
Recovering the key
Note that in the above analysis, when we deal with a particular X j+1 i+1,0 ⊕ X j i+1,0 , the other bits of X i+1,0 are random. In the key recovery attack, the value of X i+1,0 is fixed, so we need to consider the interference between the bits X We used the Phelix C source code submitted to eSTREAM in the experiments. We now proceed to recover the other bits of X 1,0 . By rotating the onebit difference between P 0 and P 0 , and using the same threshold value, we can determine the value of X . We need to improve the above attack in two approaches: recovering more key bits and improving the success rate. The direct approach is to adjust the threshold value for each key bit position. In the following, we illustrate a more advanced approach which recovers the values of Z (i) 4 before recovering the key.
Improving the Attack on Phelix
In the above attack, we use a random nonce for each plaintext pair, i.e., every nonce is used twice with the same key. When the nonce is used many times with the same key, we can introduce the difference at P i and recover the value of Z i− 3 4 by observing the distribution of S i+1 ⊕ S i+1 . Then we proceed to recover X i+1,0 .
Recovering Z (i) 4
We introduce the difference to the least significant bit of P i (P i ⊕ P i = 1). A simulation is carried out to determine the distribution of Y
. We use the randomly generated Y Denoteṗ n as the probability that Y
= 0. With 2 30 pairs, we obtain the values ofṗ n in Table 2 . Table 2 . The probability that Y From Table 2 , we notice that Y 2 4 with probability about 0.70291, while Y (i+1), 3 4 = Y (i+1), 3 4 with probability about 0.22246. Note that
, according to Theorem 2, the distribution of S i+1 ⊕ S i+1 is affected by the value of Z (i−3), 3 4 ⊕ Z (i−3), 2 4 . Next we carry out simulations to characterize this relation. We use the randomly generated Y
in the simulation. The one-bit difference is introduced to P i , i.e., P i ⊕ P i = 2 j .
Denotep n j,0 as the probability that S , we use 2 28 plaintext pairs. We find thatp can be determined with success rate 0.999 with about 2 13.9 plaintext pairs (The cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution gives value 0.999 at the point 3.1σ).
The above approach is able to recover Z
4 , but the success rate is not that high according to our experiment. In the following, we use a new approach to determine Z first, then proceed to recover the more significant bits bit-by-bit.
We start with determining the value of Z (i−3),0 4
. Let P i ⊕ P i = 1. Running the simulation with2 28 plaintext pairs, we found thatp = Z (i−3) mod 2 n . Let the difference be introduced to the kth least significant bit of P i , i.e.,
as the probability that the value of the jth bit of (S i+1 − Z
as the probability that the value of the jth bit of (S i+1 −Z = 1, we observe the third least significant bit of (S i+1 − 1) ⊕ (S i+1 − 1), and we can determine the value of Z (0), 1 4 = 0 with success rate 0.999 with about 2 11.3 plaintext pairs.
Let P i ⊕ P i = 2 2 , we are able to determine the value of Z (i−3), 2 4 by observing the fourth least significant bit of (S i+1 − Z
). In general, let P i ⊕ P i = 2 j , then we are able to determine the value of Z ) with success rate very close to 1. The number of plaintext pairs required in the above attack is about 2 12 × 30 ≈ 2 17 .
Recovering X i+1,0
After recovering Z ), we know the value of (S i+1 − Z
). Thus we know the value of
. Then we are able to recover X i+1,0 more efficiently.
Let two plaintexts differ only in the ith word. And let P i ⊕P i = 1. We use the randomly generated Y
in the simulation. For every value of the two bits X since S 1 ⊕ S 1 is a 32-bit word. The reason that the number of plaintext required for j = 9 is relatively small is that the difference for j = 13 is introduced to the most significant bit of the word P 3 , thus it causes less difference propagation, and results in a larger bias in the keystream.
Note that the most significant bit of Y 18.6 plaintext pairs are required to achieve the success rate 0.999.
In the above attacks, we recovered 28.75 bits of X i+1,0 : 
An Approach to Strengthen Helix and Phelix
In Helix and Phelix, the plaintext is used to affect the internal state of the cipher. In order to achieve a high encryption speed, each plaintext word affects the keystream without passing through sufficient confusion and diffusion layers. This is the intrinsic weakness in the structure of Helix and Phelix. In the following, we provide a method to reduce the effect of such weakness. The security of the encryption of Helix and Phelix can be improved significantly if a secure one-way function is used to generate the initial state of the cipher from the key and nonce. Then even if the internal state of one particular nonce is recovered, the impact on the security of the encryption is very limited since the key of the cipher is not affected. We believe that such an approach can be applied to improve the security of all the ciphers that use the plaintext to affect the internal state.
However, we must point out that such an approach does not substantially improve the security of the MAC in Helix and Phelix. Once an internal state is recovered, the attacker can forge many messages related to that particular nonce.
Phelix is vulnerable to a key recovery attack when chosen nonces and chosen plaintexts are used. The computational complexity of the attack is much less than that of the attack against Helix. Our attack shows that Phelix fails to strengthen Helix in this respect.
We believe that one necessary requirement for a secure general-purpose stream cipher is that the key of the cipher should not be recoverable even if the attacker can control the generation of the nonce. In practice an attacker may gain access to a Phelix encryption device for a while, reuse a nonce and recover the key. We thus consider Phelix as insecure. (When the integrity checking mechanism is not enforced, an attacker can even modify the nonces in ciphertext and obtain repeated nonces.) Muller has pointed out the practical impact of the key recovery attack with reused nonces on the security of Helix in detail [2] . Muller stated clearly the difference between the nonce reusing attack against Helix and that against a synchronous stream cipher since the attack against Helix results in key recovery. The same comments apply to the attacks against Phelix.
A The complexity to recover X i+1,0 with Z
The number of plaintext pairs and the threshold value required to recover the value of each X j+1 i+1,0 ⊕ X j i+1,0 (2 ≤ j ≤ 28) are given in Table 3 . Each value n in the second column indicates that the difference is introduced in the nth least significant bit of P i . Each value n in the third column shows that the nth least significant bit of Y (i+1) 4 is used in the attack. 
